Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) was established in 1991 to roll back the onslaught of mandatory minimum sentencing laws and promote fair and proportionate sentencing policies.
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Endnotes 33 study ways to reduce drug use. They found that long prison sentences were not an effective deterrent to drug users, that rehabilitation should be a primary objective for the government, and that courts should have wide discretion to deal with drug offenders.
President Richard Nixon took office in 1969 determined to curtail the growing drug problem. Rather than add new arbitrary and harsh mandatory sentences, the Nixon
Administration and Congress negotiated a bill that sought to address drug addiction through rehabilitation; provide better tools for law enforcement in the fight against drug trafficking and manufacturing; and provide a more balanced scheme of penalties for drug crimes. The final product, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, repealed mandatory minimum drug sentences except in limited and serious circumstances.
The Act was praised by both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. ThenCongressman George H.W. Bush (R-Texas) spoke in favor of the repeal because it would "result in better justice and more appropriate sentences." Supporting the repeal of drug mandatory minimums exposed members of Congress to no political jeopardy. Indeed, every senator, save one, and all but a handful of House members who voted for repeal won re-election. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the small number of defeated members lost because of their vote for repeal.
In the mid-and late-1980s, Congress reinstated mandatory minimum laws. This time,
Congress was reacting, in part, to the high-profile drug overdose of basketball star Len
Bias. The new laws were enacted without any hearings, debate, or study.
Today, after 20 years of experience, it is clear that the current mandatory minimums have failed as badly as those enacted in the 1950s. The evidence leads to the following conclusions about mandatory minimum sentences:
• They have not discouraged drug use in the United States.
• They have not reduced drug trafficking.
• They have created soaring state and federal corrections costs.
• They impose substantial indirect costs on families by imprisoning spouses, parents, and breadwinners for lengthy periods.
• They are not applied evenly, disproportionately impacting minorities and resulting in vastly different sentences for equally blameworthy offenders.
• They undermine federalism by turning state-level offenses into federal crimes.
• They undermine separation of powers by usurping judicial power. Today's Congress, as the 91st Congress did in 1970, should reform mandatory minimum sentencing. This report presents two options: excise all mandatory minimums for drug offenses found in the criminal code or expand the existing "safety valve" to allow judges to depart from the statutory sentence when that punishment would be excessive. Either solution will result in better and more cost effective criminal justice and pave the way for smarter alternatives.
Introduction
"A ll men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong, and he repairs the evil," Sophocles once wrote. 2 In 1970,
Congress proved it had enough wise and good men and women to do something unusual -repeal a tough criminal law that it had passed 20 years earlier. By 1970, Congress had learned that the mandatory minimum prison sentences it had passed in the 1950s to combat drug trafficking crimes were a mistake. These laws failed to reduce drug trafficking or drug use, as their proponents had claimed they would.
A mandatory minimum sentence is a required minimum term of punishment (typically incarceration) that is established by Congress or a state legislature in a statute. When a mandatory minimum applies, the judge is forced to follow it and cannot impose a sentence below the minimum term required, regardless of the unique facts and circumstances of the defendant or the offense.
In 1951, Congress adopted the Boggs Act, named for its sponsor, Representative Hale Boggs (D-La.), which imposed harsh mandatory minimum sentences on those convicted of drug crimes. Five years later, Congress added even more punitive sentences, including the death penalty for drug sales to a minor.
Over the next decade and a half, drug use soared. The tough new laws did little to deter drug trafficking and abuse, as both juvenile and adult drug usage rates exploded during the 1960s. By the end of the decade, drug use had moved out of the cities, into suburbia, and onto campuses. Seemingly convinced that mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders were ineffective, a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress voted to repeal nearly all such sentences in 1970.
Today, federal lawmakers face the same dilemma that their predecessors in the 91st
Congress faced. In the 1980s, Congress responded to the media frenzy around the crack cocaine epidemic by enacting two anti-drug crime bills containing new mandatory minimum sentences. Twenty years later, the results are in: the new penalties have failed.
These mandatory sentences are no more effective than the similar sanctions adopted in the 1950s. The question now is simple: Will members of Congress follow the example set by their predecessors in 1970 and eliminate mandatory minimums, or will they continue to stand by a costly failed experiment?
To better educate members of Congress and the American public about the choice at hand, this report presents the history of the Boggs Act and its repeal. It then examines the record of the mandatory minimums that were enacted in the mid-1980s and finds that they have failed for the same reasons as the mandatory sentences in the Boggs Act.
The report concludes that the current Congress should follow the example of the 91st Western nation, 17 drug addiction was a "contagious disease," and "Red China" was attempting to subvert American society by smuggling heroin into the country. 18 The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 was a response to both the Daniel Committee's investigation and the growing public outcry over escalating drug use. Sentences for drug traffickers were increased to a five-year minimum for a first offense and a 10-year minimum for all subsequent violations. The Act stripped judges of their ability to suspend sentences or impose probation in cases where they felt a prison sentence was inappropriate.
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Evidence Shows Mandatory Minimums Ineffective
Far from stemming the rising tide of drug use among America's youth, the era of Anslinger, with its tough mandatory sentencing laws, was followed by the Age of 20 When President Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he decried the fact that the overall number of drug addicts in America was in the "hundreds of thousands," and the number of college students using drugs was in the millions. 21 He also said what many Americans saw firsthand: drug use had expanded beyond urban cities and into middle and upper class neighborhoods. 22 Instead of stimulating public pressure for even stronger punishment for drug crimes, the grim statistics convinced experts that harsh mandatory minimum sentences were simply not working. Correctional professionals agreed. 
Nixon and Congress Get Tough...and Repeal Mandatory Minimums
President Nixon came to office in 1969 determined to curtail the rampant drug problem. eral government's approach in dealing with drug abuse, drug manufacturing, and drug trafficking. Its purpose was threefold:
• To address drug addiction through the rehabilitation of drug users,
• To provide better tools for law enforcement's fight against drug trafficking and manufacturing, and
• To provide a "balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs." 37 It sought to change the structure of all criminal penalties for controlled substances to provide a "consistent method of treatment of all persons accused of violations."
38 Most significantly, it eliminated all of the mandatory minimum drug sentences, save one. 39 The only mandatory minimum to survive repeal was for offenders who participated in a "continuing criminal enterprise," a large-scale, ongoing drug operation that earned significant profits. 40 First-time violations of simple possession of a controlled substance without the intent to distribute were reclassified as misdemeanors carrying fines and probation; judges could dismiss such charges without a finding of guilt in instances where an offender did not violate the terms of his or her probation and could expunge the offense from minors' records. 41 Members from both parties argued that the mandatory minimums then on the books limited judicial discretion, were so harsh that courts and juries avoided applying the sen- In the early 1980s a new drug, crack cocaine, emerged. The drug was cheap and easy to transport, 55 and the level of its use was viewed as "epidemic" in major cities around the country. 56 The crack epidemic brought with it fears of increased drug-related violent crime, 57 along with a number of misperceptions about the addictiveness of the drug and its effects on users. 58 As Congress was debating how to respond to mounting public fears and a media frenzy surrounding crack, 59 Americans awoke on June 20, 1986 to the news that basketball star and NBA first-round draft pick Len Bias had died the night before from an overdose from powder cocaine. 60 The tipping point was reached.
Congress wasted no time in responding to Bias's high-profile death with a display of political opportunism and "tough on crime" stances that included no meaningful reflection on the previous failure of mandatory minimums. 61 The House Judiciary
Committee drafted and passed new antidrug penalties 62 in less than one week. 63 The legislative history of this period reveals no hearings, debate, or study preceding the adoption of these provisions. 64 The lack of legislative history makes discerning
Congress's intent difficult, but one goal is clear: the mandatory penalties were intended to apply to "serious" and "major" traffickers. 65 In 1988, passage of mandatory minimums for simple possession of crack showed Congress's desire to fight use of the drug as well as drug trafficking. 66 These mandatory minimums came only a few years after Congress, in 1984, created the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 67 This expert body wrote and implemented the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, with the mandate that equally blameworthy offenders get similar sentences. 68 At the same time, the guidelines also gave courts some flexibility to tailor sentences to fit individuals or special circumstances. 69 By 1994, harsh mandatory minimum drug sentences had been imposed on thousands of minor drug offenders, and stories of over-punishment were rampant. Congress responded to mounting public pressure to change mandatory minimums by enacting the "safety valve." 70 The "safety valve" permits courts to sentence certain non-violent drug offenders below the mandatory minimum if they have a limited criminal history, did not play a leadership role in the offense, did not possess a gun or use violence, and provided the While current mandatory minimums were targeted at drug traffickers, Congress was also undeniably concerned with reducing drug use. 73 In theory, mandatory minimums would lock up drug traffickers, making drugs less available and more expensive, thus resulting in reduced drug use. 74 The theory has not worked. Price is "the most widely used measure of supply reduction effectiveness," and since 1981, the prices of both crack and powder cocaine have dropped or remained consistently lower than they were at the time mandatory minimums were passed. Some of this price decline may be due to the fact that the demand for drugs had already started to decline several years before mandatory minimums were enacted. 76 Drug use dropped among all ages from its high of 14.1 percent in 1979 to 7.7 percent in 1988 -a reduction of nearly 50 percent. 77 At a minimum, since mandatory minimum sentences were attached not only to drug trafficking offenses but also to simple possession of crack cocaine, the new stiff penalties' deterrent effect, if any, should manifest itself in falling usage of that drug. Mandatory minimums, however, did not decrease usage rates for crack and powder cocaine; rather, use decreased when negative media coverage increased the perception that using the drugs was dangerous and socially unacceptable. 78 When this perception decreased, usage of the drugs increased. 79 t Mandatory minimums have failed to reduce drug trafficking offenses.
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Proponents of mandatory minimums point to reduced national crime rates as evidence that the tough sentences work. Despite more than 50 years of experimenting with mandatory minimums, however, backers can point to no conclusive studies that demonstrate any positive impact of federal mandatory minimum sentences on the rate at which drugs are being manufactured, imported, and trafficked throughout the country. 81 National crime rate statistics do not include these types of drug trafficking offenses, so they cannot show whether mandatory sentences are reducing drug trafficking activity. 82 In fact, data from both the Federal Bureau of Investigation 83 and the Bureau of Justice Statistics 84 show a steady increase in the number of drug offenders arrested at both the state and federal levels over the last decades, as well as increases in the amount of drugs seized by law enforcement each year. 85 This data could be proof of more drug activity, better enforcement of drug laws, or both, but there is no definitive connection between mandatory minimums and reductions in drug trafficking offenses.
Large numbers of drug addicts support their habits by committing drug trafficking offenses. In 2004, almost 60 percent of federal drug traffickers reported using drugs in the month before the offense; a third were using drugs at the time of the offense. 86 A full quarter of all those convicted of a federal drug offense committed their crimes to get money to buy drugs. 87 Over half of all federal drug offenders in 2004 met the official criteria for having a drug abuse or dependence problem. 88 Mandatory minimums give drug addicts and drug traffickers lengthy prison sentences, but have failed to solve the drug abuse problems that lead to possession and trafficking offenses.
t Mandatory minimums' failure comes with billions of dollars in direct costs.
Mandatory minimums apply to almost all federal drug offenses, and the majority of people in federal prisons are drug offenders. From 1990 to 2000, drug offenders accounted for 59 percent of the growth in the federal prison population. 89 In 2000, 57 percent of federal prisoners were serving sentences for a drug offense. 90 The large number of drug convictions contributes to the growth in the federal prison population. Between 2000 and the end of 2006, the federal prison population grew by an average of nearly five percent annually. 91 The trend continues: in 2008, the federal prison population passed the 200,000 mark, and more than half of these prisoners are serving time for a drug crime. 92 Drug offenses continue to be the largest category of federal convictions (almost 35 percent of all 2007 convictions), 93 and more than 65 percent of these offenders received mandatory minimums. 94 Because the U.S. Sentencing Commission has used mandatory minimums as the starting point for calculating other drug sentences under the guidelines, almost all drug sentences have gotten longer. • 34 percent of all federal offenders in 2007
were sentenced for a drug offense.
• 67 percent of all federal drug offenders received a mandatory minimum: 31, 2008) . 108 The five and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine were used as a starting point for calculating the rest of the guideline ranges for other crack offenses in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 109 As a result, sentences for crack offenses are uniformly harsher than those for powder cocaine offenses.
In 2006, crack cocaine sentences (both mandatory terms and those calculated under the guidelines) were 44 percent longer than powder cocaine sentences. 110 The way mandatory minimums are applied can also undermine the principle that two equally culpable defendants who committed the same crime should generally get the same sentence. Two equally blameworthy defendants facing the same mandatory minimum can, in fact, receive very different sentences, depending on what they know or which prosecutor they get. More culpable defendants can get shorter sentences than their less culpable cohorts, too. One of the only ways to be sentenced below the mandatory minimum is to provide "substantial assistance" to the prosecution by sharing information about the crime and other offenders. 111 Offering assistance to the prosecution is encouraged and necessary to expedite cases through the system, but can result in inequity when offenders are sentenced more harshly than their equally culpable codefendants solely because they have little or no valuable information to offer. 112 Prosecutors decide what information is considered valuable, which influences whether a person gets a reduction.
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t Mandatory minimums undermine federalism and separation of powers.
Mandatory minimum laws enacted against drug users have federalized offenses that fall under state jurisdiction. This federalization occurs because federal mandatory minimums are being applied to a much larger group of offenders than their proponents intended.
Designed to bring down "kingpins," the whales of drug trafficking, 114 the federal mandatory minimum laws are also being used to prosecute the minnows. 22, 2008) . 129 In part because of the pressure this put on state budgets, as well as an evolving understanding of effective sentencing and punishment, many states have revisited these policies. 130 States are reforming or eliminating their mandatory minimums, especially those covering low-level, nonviolent drug offenses, or creating alternatives to incarceration for these offenders. 131 Michigan, for example, under Republican Governor John Engler, repealed nearly all of its mandatory minimum drug sentences in 2003, replacing them with a more flexible sentencing guidelines system. 132 In 2001, Louisiana repealed mandatory sentences for simple possession of drugs and cut its minimum drug trafficking terms by half. 133 The same year, North Dakota repealed its mandatory minimum for first-time drug offenders, and
Connecticut allowed courts more freedom to disregard mandatory penalties for drug possession or dealing when "good cause" to do so exists, even if the offense occurred in a "drug-free school zone." 136 Studies continue to show that drug courts are cost-effective, reduce recidivism, and lower crime rates, and the number of these courts has increased as states have gotten the message. 137 Texas Governor Rick Perry described these programs as "help [ing] break the cycle of addiction and crime by using the authority of the court to promote accountability and enhance motivation for treatment." 138 Interestingly, as in the 1970s, there has been no evidence of electoral backlash against the politicians who have backed these state-level reforms.
Unlike in 1970, reform of federal mandatory minimums today would not initiate an ad hoc approach to sentencing, thanks to the sentencing guidelines. 139 The guidelines give judges the ability to protect public safety by sentencing harshly when it is deserved. An offender with numerous prior convictions, a gun, or a role as a manager or leader can often receive a guideline sentence that is longer (and sometimes much longer) than the currently applicable mandatory minimum. t Excise mandatory minimums from the criminal code.
Congress could excise all mandatory minimums for drug offenses found in Title 21 of the U.S. Code, while retaining the existing statutory maximums and sentencing guidelines for those offenses. The guidelines, while indexed to the mandatory minimums, are nuanced and capable of accounting for important differences among offenders. Allowing the guidelines to stand alone would give the courts flexibility to impose appropriate sentences in all cases.
t Expand the existing statutory safety valve.
Congress could maintain the current mandatory minimum sentences, but provide courts an opportunity to opt out of them in certain cases by expanding the existing statutory safety valve. 141 Currently, the safety valve allows suspension of the mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases when a judge finds the case meets certain criteria. 142 When those strict criteria are met the court may impose a guideline sentence in lieu of the mandatory minimum sentence.
Congress could expand the safety valve by permitting courts to invoke it when, after looking at all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and considering the purposes of punishment, imposing the mandatory minimum sentence would violate the parsimony mandate found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This provision directs judges to impose a sentence that is "sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes" of sentencing. 143 This mandate is a longstanding, highly esteemed, and uncontroversial feature of American sentencing law. The current mandatory minimum laws, enacted during the crack cocaine epidemic of the mid-1980s, have imposed too many burdens with no corresponding benefit. It is time once again for Congress to correct course and eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders.
